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CASE NOTES
lowing administrators to concentrate on policymaking and supervisory
functions, rather than participation in protracted discovery and litiga-
tion, should improve the efficiency of the administrative system in
Minnesota.
Constitutional Law--CHURCH PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIoN-Ideal Life
Church of Lake Elmo v. County of Washington, 304 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. 1981).
Religious organizations have long enjoyed a variety of exemptions
from property and income taxes.' Tax exemptions for church property
date from colonial times in the United States and from as far back as the
third century in Europe. 2 Church property tax exemptions in this coun-
try have traditionally rested on statutory or constitutional provisions. 3 A
1. Religious tax exemptions pre-date the Revolutionary War. Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676-77 (1970). Federal income taxation has always exempted
religious organizations. See Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556; Act of
Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § IIG(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172; I.R.C. §§ 501-515 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. See Paulsen, Preferment of Rehgious Institutions in Tax and Labor Legislation, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 144, 147-48 (1949); Van Alstyne, Tax Exemption of Church Property, 20
OHIO ST. L.J. 461, 461-62 (1959); Zollman, Tax Exemptions of Amertan Church Property, 14
MICH. L. REV. 646, 647-50 (1916).
3. See, e.g., Parker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 365 F.2d 792, 795 (8th Cir.
1966); Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644, 648, 298 P.2d 1, 4 (1956).
Minnesota's church property exemption is statutory. See MINN. STAT. § 272.02
(1982). The church property tax exemptions of Florida, Mair.e and Michigan are similar
to Minnesota's. See FLA. STAT. § 196.191 (1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 652
(1978); MICH. CoMP. LAws § 211.7 (1967).
Examples of statutes requiring only ownership by religious organizations include
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-81 (West Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 8103
(1975); and S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-37-220(3) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1982).
Use-based statutes are classified further as to type of use. See Ky. CONST. § 170
("places actually used for religious worship"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72 § 5020-204 (Purdon
Supp. 1983) ("actual places of regularly stated religious worship"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32,
§ 3802 (1981).
Some exemptions focus on the nature of the use, e.g., primarily or exclusively reli-
gious or non-profit. See ALA. CODE § 40-9-1 (Supp. 1982) (exclusive); ALASKA CONST. art.
9, § 4 (exclusive, non-profit); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-271 (Supp. 1982) (non-profit);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-206 (1980) (exclusive); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-3-101(e) (1973)
(primary); D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1002(13) (1981) (same); GA. CONST. § 2-4604 (non-
profit); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 246-32(b)(3) (1976) (same); IDAHO CODE § 63-105B (1976)
(exclusive); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 500.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982) (exclusive, non-
profit); IOWA CODE ANN. § 427.1.9 (West Supp. 1983) (same); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-201
(Supp. 1982) (same); LA. CONST. art. 7, § 21(b)(l) (exclusive, non-profit); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 81, § 9(c) (1975) (exclusive); Mo. REV. STAT. § 137.100 (Vernon Supp. 1983) (exclu-
sive, non-profit); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West Supp. 1983) (exclusive); N.M. CONST.
art. VIII, § 3 (non-profit); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-02-08(7) (Supp. 1981) (exclusive); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.07 (Page 1980) (exclusive, non-profit); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68
§ 24 05(g) (West 1966) (exclusive); OR. REV. STAT. § 307.140 (1981) (same); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 44-3-3 (Supp. 1982) (same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 10-4-9 (1982) (same);
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.20 (Vernon 1982) (primary, non-profit); UTAH CODE ANN.
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historical study of American churches reveals several justifications for the
existence of church property tax exemptions. First, there is America's
strong commitment to religious freedom that finds its origin in the colo-
nization of a land free from religious persecution.4 Second, religion is
viewed as a social institution that promotes moral and mental improve-
ment. 5 Third, the tangible social benefits religion bestows on society sig-
nificantly outweigh any revenues that taxation of church property would
produce. 6 Finally, tax exemption is viewed as less entangling than taxa-
§ 59-2-1 (1953) (exclusive); VA. CODE § 58-12(2) (1974) (same); WASH REV. CODE ANN.
§ 84.36.020 (Supp. 1983) (exclusive, non-profit); W. VA. CODE § 11-3-9 (1974) (exclusive);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 70.11(4) (West Supp. 1982) (same); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 39-1-
201(a)(vii) (1977) (same).
Some statutes focus on both use and ownership. See CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 214
(West Supp. 1983); IND. CODE § 6-1.1-10-21(a) (1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 59,
§ 5(11) (West Supp. 1983); MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-31-1(d) (Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 15-6-201 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-202(c) (1981); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 361.125(1) (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72:23(111) (1971); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX
LAW § 421(1)(a) (McKinney 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-278.3 (1979); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 67-513 (Supp. 1982).
4. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1947).
A large portion of the early settlers of this country came here from Europe to
escape the bondage of laws which compelled them to support and attend govern-
ment-favored churches. The centuries immediately before and contemporane-
ous with the colonization of America had been filled with turmoil, civil strife,
and persecutions, generated in large part by established sects determined to
maintain their absolute political and religious supremacy.
Id. at 8-9. See generally L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 71 (1967); W.
SWEET, RELIGION IN COLONIAL AMERICA (1942). Some have argued that religious tax
exemptions are required by the first amendment free exercise clause. See Schwarz, Limiting
Religious Tax Exemptions: When Should the Church Render unto Caesar?, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 50,
54-55 (1976).
5. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970). Some commentators have
justified the tax exemption on the morally uplifting influence that religions and churches
have on society. See Schwarz, supra note 4, at 54, 56; Stimson, The Exemption of Property fom
Taxation in the United States, 18 MINN. L. REV. 411, 422 (1934); cf Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306, 313 (1952) ("[w]e make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the
spiritual needs of man deem necessary"). But see Paulsen, supra note 2, at 150; Comment,
Defining Religion. Of God, the Constitution and the D.A.R., 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 549 n.82
(1965).
Other more objective justifications for religious tax exemptions are that it would be
an unecor.omic allocation of resources to tax socially valuable, privately organized activi-
ties, Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestabhhment, and Doctrinal Development, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 513, 549, 553 (1968), and that churches fall into the class of non-profit organizations
that includes charitable and educational institutions. Paulsen, supra note 2, at 151 n.58.
Although these justifications appear more objective, their underlying base is the social
"good works" produced by religious organizations.
The "up-lifting influence" rationale is perhaps less compelling today with many reli-
gious organizations and their leaders becoming active in partisan politics. A religion or
church that works for the establishment of its beliefs or doctrines through the political
process is arguably not a benign wholesome charity welcomed by the public at large and
above all reproach.
6. See Schwarz, supra note 4, at 54-56.
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tion, and is therefore considered more in harmony with the free exercise
clause.
7
Like other tax exemptions, church property tax exemptions are in der-
ogation of society's interest in equality of taxation.8 For this reason tax
exemption statutes are strictly construed.9 The burden of proving ex-
empt status is placed on the person or organization seeking the exemp-
tion.10  The use of the property, its reasonable relation to the
accomplishment of the objectives of the institution that owns it, and the
connection between these objectives and the legislative intent constitute
the essentials of all property tax exemptions."l
When the constitutionality of church property tax exemptions was
challenged in the case of Walz v. Tax Commt'sstion,12 the United States
Supreme Court held that although such tax exemptions were not re-
quired by the first amendment, they were constitutional.' 3 The Walz
Court noted that church property tax exemptions were a matter of legis-
lative grace and that taxation of church property created the potential
for direct confrontation between church and state and for greater gov-
7. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75, 676 (1970). Another rationale for
religious tax exemption is that because religious groups are non-profit organizations, ex-
empting them from taxation confers no real benefit. See Schwarz, supra note 4, at 54, 56.
8. See, e.g., Conference of Major Religious Superiors of Women, Inc. v. District of
Columbia, 348 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Community Hosp. Linen Servs., Inc. v. Com-
missioner of Taxation, 309 Minn. 447, 245 N.W.2d 190 (1976).
9. "One of the rules that is well established is that taxation is the rule and exemption
is an exception in derogation of equal rights. Therefore, there is a presumption that all
property is taxable." 304 N.W.2d at 313, quoting Camping & Educ. Found. v. State, 282
Minn. 245, 250, 164 N.W.2d 369, 372 (1969); see also Ramaley v. City of St. Paul, 226
Minn. 406, 33 N.W.2d 19 (1948); County of Ramsey v. Church of the Good Shepherd, 45
Minn. 229, 47 N.W. 783 (1891); County of Hennepin v. Bell, 43 Minn. 344, 45 N.W. 615
(1890); St. Peters Church of Shakopee v. Board of County Comm'rs, 12 Minn. 395, 12 Gil.
280 (1867).
10. See Wilson v. United States, 588 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1978); Co-Operative Grain &
Supply Co. v. C.I.R., 407 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1969); Community Hosp. Linen Servs., Inc.
v. Commissioner of Taxation, 309 Minn. 447, 245 N.W.2d 190 (1976); cf. Cirillo v. C.I.R.,
314 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1963) (burden of establishing deduction on taxpayer); Abex Corp. v.
Commissioner of Taxation, 295 Minn. 445, 207 N.W.2d 37 (1973) (presumption against
exemption from taxation); Camping & Educ. Found. v. State, 282 Minn. 245, 164 N.W.2d
369 (1969) (presumption against exemption). But see Passaic United Hebrew Burial Ass'n
v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 500, 505 (D.N.J. 1963) (construing I.R.C. §§ 501(a), (c)(3),
court held that statutes relating to tax exemption for charitable or religious purposes
should be liberally construed).
11. State v. Board of Foreign Missions of Augustana Synod, 221 Minn. 536, 541, 22
N.W.2d 642, 645 (1946); see Christian Business Men's Comm. v. State, 228 Minn. 549,
554, 38 N.W.2d 803, 808 (1949).
12. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
13. Granting a property tax exemption guards against the constitutional danger of
the financial oppression of churches without actually supporting the institutions. Id. at
672, 673, 676.
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ernmental involvement in religious matters.14  Although the
Wakzdecision reaffirmed the preferred status of religious organizations in
our tax system, the recent proliferation of religious organizations estab-
lished primarily to camouflage the use of illegal drugs' 5 or to avoid taxa-
tion 16 has forced tax officials and courts to stringently define terms such
as "church" and "religious purpose" and to deny exemptions to organi-
zations that do not meet those definitions.' 7
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Ideal Life Church of Lake Elmo v.
County of Washington 18 decided that a religious organization was a subter-
fuge to avoid property taxation. The exemption was denied despite
claims that the constitutional guarantees of free exercise of religion and
against governmental establishment of religion were being impinged. In
construing Minnesota's statutory and constitutional property tax exemp-
tions for churches,' 9 the Minnesota court adopted a "multifactual analy-
sis"20 to determine whether a religious association was a "church" for
property tax exemption purposes. 2'
The Ideal Life Church was incorporated pursuant to the Minnesota
14. See id. at 672-75. The desire to minimize church-state conflicts echoes the histori-
cal reason behind the first amendment principle of separation of church and state, a neces-
sity dictated by the preservation of public peace. J. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS
58-59 (1960); Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 2-4
(1961). For a discussion on the purpose of the first amendment religion clauses, see Justice
Rutledge's dissent in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31-43 (1947).
15. E.g., Randall v. Wyrick, 441 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Mo. 1977); People v. Mullins, 50
Cal. App. 3d 61, 123 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1975); Town v. State ex re. Reno, 377 So. 2d 648
(Fla. 1979), appeal dismissedfor want qfurisdiction, 449 U.S. 803 (1980); People v. Crawford,
69 Misc. 2d 500, 328 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1972); State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565
(1966); State v. Brashear, 92 N.M. 622, 593 P.2d 63 (Ct. App. 1979); Lewellyn v. State,
592 P.2d 538 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979). For an anlaysis of the above-cited cases, see Com-
ment, Brave New World Revisited: Fieen Years of Chemical Sacraments, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 879.
16. "Mail order ministries" are examples of such religious organizations. Although
courts have never expressly stated that their refusal to grant tax exempt status was on
account of the tax-avoidance purpose of these organizations, the conclusion is implicit. See
Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1009 (1969); Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 770 (E.D.
Cal. 1974); Golden Rule Church Ass'n, 41 T.C. 719 (1964); Saint Germain Founds., 26
T.C. 657 (1956).
17. See cases cited supra notes 15 & 16.
18. 304 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. 1981).
19. MINN. CONST. art. X, § 1, provides in part that "all churches, church property,
houses of worship. . . shall be exempt from taxation except as provided in this section."
The statutory exemption in Minnesota states that "[e]xcept as provided in other sub-
divisions of this section or in section 272.025 or section 273.13, subdivisions 17, 17b, 17c or
17d, all property described in this section to the extent herein limited shall be exempt
from taxation: .. . (5) All churches, church property, and houses of worship." MINN.
STAT. § 272.02, subd. 1(5) (1982) (originally enacted 1878 Minn. Laws. ch. 1, § 5).
20. 304 N.W.2d at 315-16.
21. Id. at 317.
[Vol. 8
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religious association statute.22 Originally, the Ideal Life Church associa-
tion comprised eleven members, all from the LeRoy Rossow family.
2 3
LeRoy Rossow was chairman, minister, and president of the church.
2 4
Shortly after incorporation, the Rossow residence, homesteaded since its
construction in 1971 or 1972, was conveyed to the Ideal Life Church.
25
Rossow subsequently applied for a church property tax exemption.2
6
The application was denied by the Washington County assessor, the lo-
cal and county boards of review, the State Board of Equalization, and
the tax court. 27 The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the denial. 28
In its decision the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the tax court's
test for determining whether an organization qualified for the church
property tax exemption. 29 The Minnesota court held that the property
must be owned by a "church" 30 and that it must be 'appropriately used'
22. MINN. STAT. § 315.21(1) (1982) provides:
The members of any church or religious society, not less than three in number,
not wishing to form a corporation under any of the preceding provisions of this
chapter, may become a corporation by adopting and signing a certificate
containing:
1. Its name, general purpose and plan of operation, and its location; and
2. The terms of admission, qualification for membership, selection of of-
ficers, filling vacancies, and the manner in which the same is to be managed.
Prior provisions of the chapter deal with forming a corporation by trusteeship, parish,
diocese or cathedral. See MINN. STAT. ch. 315 (1982). Originally, the Minnesota Consti-
tution exempted church property "used for religious purposes" only, which indicates that
the legislative intent behind the church property tax exemption was to exempt structures
that were used as houses of public worship. See St. Peter's Church of Shakopee v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 12 Minn. 395, 12 Gil. 280 (1867).
23. 304 N.W.2d at 310 n.3.
24. Id. at 310 n.2.
25. Id at 310.
26. Id. at 311.
27. Id. at 310.
28. Id. at 317.
29. Id. at 315. This test is similiar to the test used in charitable organization tax cases.
In Minnesota, a charitable tax exemption requires the organization to: 1) be organized
and operated for the purpose of rendering aid, comfort, and assistance to the sick and
indigent; 2) be supported and maintained in part by benevolent contributions; 3) be con-
ducted without a view toward profit; 4) be open to the public generally without restric-
tion; 5) be operated so as to lessen the burdens of government; 6) be organized and
operated so that its charitable aids reach an indefinite number of people; 7) be organized
and operated so that its commercial activities are subordinate to or incidential to charita-
ble activities. See MINN. STAT. § 297A.25(l)(p) (1982). Section 297A.25(l)(p) exempts
from sales tax the gross receipts from the sale of tangible personal property to charitable,
religious or educational organizations. See Mayo Found. v. Commissioner of Revenue,
306 Minn. 25, 36, 236 N.W.2d 767, 772-73 (1975); stee also Camping & Educ. Found. v.
State, 282 Minn. 245, 164 N.W.2d 369 (1969); State v. Evans Scholars Found., 278 Minn.
74, 153 N.W.2d 148 (1967); Assembly Homes, Inc. v. Yellow Medicine County, 273 Minn.
197, 140 N.W.2d 336 (1966); State v. Bishop Seabury Mission, 90 Minn. 92, 95 N.W. 882
(1903); County of Hennepin v. Brotherhood of Gethsemane, 27 Minn. 460, 80 N.W. 595
(1881).
30. 304 N.W.2d at 313. The court noted, "The only Minnesota case which even re-
1982]
5
et al.: Constitutional Law—Church Property Tax Exemption—Ideal Life Churc
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
by the church.31 Because the court found that the property was not
owned by a church, it did not address the question of use.32
The Ideal Life court provided an objective multifactual analysis to de-
termine whether an organization is a "church." 33 The analysis focused
on the following eight factors: (1) whether the religious organization was
organized primarily for tax avoidance purposes; (2) whether it had any
formally trained or ordained ministers; (3) whether it had any sacra-
ments, rituals, education classes or literature of its own; (4) whether it
had a liturgy, other than simple meetings or social gatherings;
(5) whether it required a belief in a supreme being; (6) whether it ad-
vanced its doctrines and beliefs as a way of life; (7) whether these beliefs
were vague and non-binding upon its members; and (8) whether its
members freely continued to practice other religions.34
This analysis is a combination of the factors used by courts considering
charitable organization tax exemptions35 and the criteria used by the
Internal Revenue Service when considering federal income tax exemp-
tions for churches.36 Both the charitable organization and income tax
motely indicates what sort of factors make up a 'church' for tax exemption purposes is
State v. Board of Foreign Missions of Augustana Synod, 221 Minn. 536, 22 N.W.2d 642
(1946)." Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 317.
33. Id. at 313-15; see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
34. 304 N.W.2d at 315.
35. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
36. Sections 501 and 170 of the Internal Revenue Code closely parallel the religious
property tax exemption. Section 501 exempts institutions
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or interna-
tional amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the
provision of athletic facilities or equipment) or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals
from federal income tax. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976). Contributions to § 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions are deductible for federal income tax purposes. I.R.C. §§ 170(a), (c)(2)(B) (1976).
Section 170 indicates that Congress intended a narrower definition of "church" than
"religious organization." Section 170(c) includes organizations organized and operated
exclusively for religious purposes in its definition of charitable contribution, however, only
contributions to "a church or convention or association of churches" are deductible by the
individual taxpayer in an amount up to 50% of his adjusted gross income. I.R.C.
§ 170(b)(l)(A) (1976). Other charitable contributions are deductible at a lower percent-
age. I.R.C. § 170(b)(l)(B) (1976). A § 501 "religious organization," therefore, may be
denied "church" status under § 170. See American Guidance Found., Inc. v. United
States, 490 F. Supp. 304 (D.D.C. 1980).
Two tests are used to determine whether a group is organized and operated exclu-
sively for religious purposes under § 501: the organizational test and the operational test.
Both tests must be met or the entity will be denied tax exempt status. See Levy Family
Tribute Found., 69 T.C. 615 (1978); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a) (1980).
The organizational test is met if the members of a purported religious organization
have a "sincere and meaningful" belief in the organization's doctrine, provided this belief
occupies, in the lives of those members, a place parallel to that filled by God in the lives of
[Vol. 8
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factors focus on the purpose of the organization and whether the exemp-
tion was intended to cover organizations with that purpose.
The multifactual analysis adopted by the Ideal Life court presents two
significant problems. First, the multifactual analysis, with the exception
of the first factor, attempts to define "church" or "religion" in objective
terms.3 7 The Ideal Life majority noted that "[t]here is no Minnesota case
law or legislation defining the word 'church.' "38
Justice Wahl, in her concurring opinion, rejected the multifactual
analysis' characterization of "church." In her opinion, the majority's
definitions of "church" and "religion" were "unduly restrictive and
traditional" for constitutional purposes. 39 Justice Wahl argued that the
substance of an organization's operation and the sincerity of belief of its
members, not its form, should be the focus of the inquiry.40 Justice
traditionally religious persons. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INTERNAL MANUAL SUP-
PLEMENT 7(10) G-37, at 5 (Mar. 15, 1979). This test is compelled by United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), where the Court held that the exemption from military train-
ing and service for those who conscientiously objected "by reason of religious training and
belief" included applicants whose sincere and meaningful beliefs occupied a place in their
lives equal to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one clearly qualified for the
exemption. Id. at 166.
The operational test is satisfied if the organization (1) engages primarily in activities
which accomplish its religious purposes, (2) serves a public rather than a private interest,
and (3) has net earnings which do not inure to the benefit of a private shareholder or
individual. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3) (1980).
Thus a "church" is merely a specialized form of "religious organization" and analysis
of an organization purporting to be a "church" must begin with an examination of the
sincerity of its members' beliefs. It is interesting to note that after the Minnesota Tax
Court rendered its decision on the Ideal Life Church, the Internal Revenue Service in-
formed the Minnesota Attorney General's office that the Ideal Life Church was not an
exempt organization under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976). See 304 N.W.2d at 312.
For a detailed discussion of the administration of I.R.C. § 501 (1980), see Note, Mail
Order Ministries, The Religious Purpose Exemption, and The Constitution, 33 TAX LA v. 959
(1980).
37. 304 N.W.2d at 315 (Wahl, J., concurring). Clearly no court wishes to embark on
doctrinal examinations of a religious creed. See United States v. Ballard, 372 U.S. 78, 87
(1943).
38. 304 N.W.2d at 313.
39. Id. at 317-20.
40. Id. at 318. "The Tax Court and tax agencies are concerned with many kinds of
tax fraud; therefore, the substance of the transaction or operation, not merley its form,
must be examined for tax purposes." Id. Justice Wahl pointed out that defining a church
for tax exemption purposes does not necessarily prevent fraud; a definition merely pro-
vides a checklist for the clever tax dodger. Justice Wahl went on to say that
[t]he goal is not to show that a particular activity is not a church but "that the
beliefs asserted to be religious are not held in good faith by those asserting them,
and that forms of religious organization were erected for the sole purpose of
cloaking a secular enterprise with the legal protections of religion."
Id. at 318, quoting Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1162
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969); see also Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d 562 (8th
Cir. 1981).
1982]
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Wahl's misgivings about the majority's reasoning point to the second
problem with multifactual analysis, its possible unconstitutionality.
The multifactual analysis, with the exception of the "sham transac-
tion" factor, provides a useful "checklist" for the creation of a fraudulent
tax exemption. Well-established principles of tax law dictate the disre-
gard of form when the intent of the organization is to avoid taxation.41
In reality, the "sham transaction" factor underlies the seven other ques-
tions used in the multifactual analysis. Defining a "church" beyond the
perfunctory "sham transaction" test invites inevitably unsuccessful at-
tempts to define what a religion is. Since courts typically avoid constitu-
tional questions when there are dispositive nonconstitutional grounds for
a decision, 42 it is surprising that the Minnesota Supreme Court decided
Ideal Life on such broad constitutional principles. Courts are ill-
equipped to decide what constitutes a religion. An analysis looking to
tax avoidance alone43 would have led the Ideal Life court to the same
conclusion without constitutional ramifications.
The major constitutional inadequacy of the multifactual analysis is the
fifth factor, which looks for belief in a supreme being. It is left to conjec-
ture how the supreme-being requirement is to be applied and whether
non-theistic philosophies will constitute legitimate religions or churches.
The United States Supreme Court has rejected theism as a requirement
for religion, noting that Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, and Secular
Humanism are accepted religions that do not require a belief in a
supreme being.4
4
41. See, e.g., Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940); Boyter v. Commissioner, 668 F.2d
1382 (4th Cir. 1981); Owens v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 1233 (6th Cir. 1977).
42. Commenting on the well-established principle of avoiding unnecessary constitu-
tional challenges, the United States Supreme Court recently noted: "This court will not
pass on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided." United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27
(1980); see Califano v. Yamaski, 442 U.S. 682, 693 (1979); New York City Transit Auth. v.
Beager, 440 U.S. 568, 582 & n.22 (1979); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960);
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944); Ashwander v. TVA,
297 U.S. 288, 346-37 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Guy v. Rolvaag, 233 F.
Supp. 301 (D. Minn. 1964) (courts should avoid unnecessary decision of constitutional
questions); Midland Glass Co. v. City of Shakopee, 303 Minn. 134, 226 N.W.2d 324 (1975)
(case should be decided without determining constitutionality of statute if possible); State
ex rel Gozback v. Common School Dist. No. 65, 234 Minn. 150, 54 N.W.2d 130 (1952)
(question of constitutionality not to be decided unless absolutely necessary); State v.
Meyer, 228 Minn. 286, 37 N.W.2d 286 (1949) (courts should not decide constitutional
issues if other grounds of decision are available).
43. See Church v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 770, 776 (E.D. Cal. 1974). An appro-
priately accommodating objective test seems more desirable. However, the potential con-
stitutional problems inherent in a wooden objective standard necessitate a cautious
formulation of such a standard. See Worthing, "Re/igion" and "Rehgious Institutions" Under
the First Amendment, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 313, 352 (1980).
44. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 n.l (1961) (Maryland test of belief in
existence of God as prerequisite for state office declared unconstitutional). This list is not
[Vol. 8
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss3/9
CASE NOTES
The Ideal Life decision is also constitutionally questionable because the
first amendment establishment clause prohibits the government from be-
coming excessively entangled in the advancement of religion.45 The
Minnesota court's decision to utilize factors that examine an organiza-
tion's belief in a supreme being fosters philosophical entanglement in
theistic religions. If a state grants church property tax exemptions only
to religious organizations that are theistic, then the state is excessively
entangling itself in the advancement of theistic religions.
In Lemon v. Kurlzman46 the United States Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes providing
state aid to private, religiously oriented elementary and secondary
schools.4 7 The statutes were "challenged as violative of the establish-
ment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment."48 In holding
the statutes unconstitutional the Lemon Court stated:
The language of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is at best
opaque. . . . Its authors did not simply prohibit the establishment of
a state church or a state religion, an area history shows they regarded
as very important and fraught with great dangers. Instead they com-
manded that there should be "no law respectbig an establishment of reli-
gion." A law may be one "respecting" the forbidden objective while
falling short of its total realization. A law "respecting" the proscribed
result, that is, the establishment of religion, is not always easily identifi-
able as one violative of the Clause. A given law might not eslabhsh a
state religion but nevertheless be one "respecting" that end in the sense
of being a step that could lead to such establishment and hence offend
the First Amendment. 49
The Court identified three specific evils that the establishment clause is
intended to prevent: "Sponsorship, financial support, and active in-
volvement of the sovereign in religious activity."50
The Ideal Life holding conflicts with Lemon insofar as it construes the
exhaustive. Seegenerally H. SMITH, THE RELIGIONS OF MAN (1958); J. WALZ, THE COM-
PARATIVE STUDY OF RELIGIONS (1961).
45. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment estab-
lishment clause requires government to refrain from excessive entanglement in the
advancement of religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (salary supple-
ment to parochial teachers); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1969) (constitutional
challenge of property tax exemption); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayer in
public schools); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Catholic school bus fare
reimbursement).
46. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
47. The funds used in both statutes apparently originated from the general tax reve-
nues of each state. Id. at 607-10. Rhode Island provided a salary supplement for teachers
of secular subjects in non-public elementary schools. Id. at 607. Pennsylvania's program
was similar but it also provided funds for textbooks and instructional materials. Id. at 609.
48. Id. at 606.
49. Id. at 612.
50. Id., citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
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Minnesota church property tax exemption in a way that financially sup-
ports orthodox, mainstream, theistic religions. A church satisfying the
requirements of the Ideal Life's multifactual analysis enjoys the benefits of
a property tax exemption, whereas a "church" not fulfilling a sufficient
number of the last seven factors does not. As construed by the Ideal Life
court, the Minnesota church property tax exemption aids and, therefore,
"respects" theistic as opposed to non-theistic religions. While such aid
obviously falls short of establishing a state church or religion, it does con-
stitute discriminatory sponsorship and financial support of religious ac-
tivity contrary to the principles of Lemon.
In addition to the establishment clause difficulties, the Ideal Life multi-
factual analysis introduces free exercise problems. The free exercise
clause limits government regulation or interference with religious prac-
tices. 5' By withholding the benefit of a property tax exemption from a
religious organization, the government necessarily inhibits free exercise
of religious beliefs. While the Ideal Life facts presented no free exercise
issues, the Minnesota Supreme Court should have future occasion to deal
with this problem.
Cases interpreting both the establishment and free exercise clauses im-
ply that the proper method of resolving the delicate question of what is a
religious belief is through a sincerity of belief test. 52 In the landmark
case of Wisconsin v. Yoder53 the United States Supreme Court focused on
the presence of a "deep religious conviction." 54 Justice Wahl's scrutiny
of the substance ofan" organization's operation for tax purposes parallels
the Yoder standard. A depth-of-conviction or sincerity-of-belief test obvi-
ates the need for judicial classification of "religious" dogma and ritual.
A more constitutionally acceptable standard is that proposed by Judge
Adams in the Third Circuit case of Malnak v. Maharishi Mahesh Yogi. 55 In
51. The free exercise clause limits government restrictions on religious practice. See
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (withdrawal of Amish children from public
school); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (conscientious objection to "unjust"
war); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (conscientious objector exemption);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday closing statute affecting Orthodox Jew's
business); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (mandatory
flag salute in classroom); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (regulation of
Mormon practice of polygamy).
Ultimately, the Court seeks a neutral balance between the free exercise and establish-
ment clauses. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952). See generaloy Zollman, supra note 2.
Government neutrality and the voluntary choice of the individual in religious matters
are the two basic values the religious clauses were historically intended to protect. See L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 818-19 (1978); Giannella, supra note 5, at 516-
26.
52. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
53. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
54. Id. at 216.
55. 592 F.2d 197, 207-13 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
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a concurring opinion Judge Adams looked to three factors: the ultimate
concern to which the beliefs of the religion were directed, 56 the compre-
hensiveness of the beliefs,57 and the institutional nature of the beliefs.58
The ultimate concern criterion is the most crucial and is derived from the
United States Supreme Court cases of United States v. Seeger59 and Welsh v.
Uni'ted States,6° in which the Court, considering the beliefs of conscien-
tious objectors to military service, held that deeply and sincerely held
beliefs comparable in subjective importance to the beliefs of members of
orthodox religions constitute 'religious' beliefs for purposes of conscien-
tious objector status.
6 1
The second criterion, comprehensiveness, looks to the breadth of a sys-
tem of beliefs concerning issues of ultimate concern. 62 The comprehen-
56. id. at 208. The "ultimate concern" question examines the general nature of the
belief and is derived from the writings of Dr. Paul Tillich, who was cited by the Seeger
Court and by Judge Adams. See P. TILLICH, DYNAMICS OF FAITH 1-2 (1958). "Ultimate
concern" refers to the basic axioms or principles an individual holds as crucial to his exist-
ence. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 180-83 (1965). Judge Adams listed "the
meaning of life and death, man's role in the Universe, [and] the proper moral code of right
and wrong" as examples. 592 F.d at 208.
57. "A religion is not generally confined to one question or one moral teaching; it has
a broader scope. It lays claim to an ultimate and comprehensive 'truth.'" 592 F.2d at
209.
58. Judge Adams described this indicia as
any formal, external, or surface signs that may be analogized to accepted reli-
gions. Such signs might include formal services, ceremonial functions, the exist-
ence of clergy, structure and organization, efforts at propagation, observation of
holidays and other similar manifestations associated with traditional religions.
592 F.2d at 209.
59. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
60. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
61. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184-85; Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339-40.
62. See 592 F.2d at 209. Judge Adams rejected a dual constitutional definition of the
word religion. Advocates of a dual definition of religion argue that there should be a
broad definition for free exercise cases and a narrow definition for establishment clause
cases. L. TRIBE, supra note 51, at 827-28; Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 775 (D.
Ariz. 1963) (establishment clause definition looks to the minority's concept). See generally
Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1686-87 n. 14 (1969); Ga-
lanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States. A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 217, 266-
67; Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1084-85
(1978).
The unitary definition of religion refers to the consistent construction of the word
religion for first amendment constitutional purposes. Dissenting in Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 28-63 (1947), a case dealing with transportation aid granted to Catholic
schools, Justice Rutledge described the unitary concept of religion:
The Amendment's purpose was not to strike merely at the official establish-
ment of a single sect, creed or religion, outlawing only a formal relation such as
had prevailed in England and some of the colonies. Necessarily it was to uproot
all such relationships. But the object was broader than separating church and
state in this narrow sense. It was to create a complete and permanent separation
of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbid-
ding every form of public aid or support for religion. ...
"Religion" appears only once in the Amendment. But the word governs
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